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Abstract—Self-healing key distribution schemes enable a group
user to recover session keys from two broadcast messages it
received before and after those sessions, even if broadcast mes-
sages for middle sessions are lost due to network failure. These
schemes are quite suitable for supporting secure communication
over unreliable networks such as sensor networks and ad hoc
networks. An efficient self-healing key distribution scheme is
proposed in this paper. The scheme based on the concept of access
polynomial and self-healing key distribution model constructed
by Hong et al. The new scheme reduces communication overhead
and computation overhead greatly yet still keeps the constant
storage overhead. In addition, we consider the possibility of
mutual-healing between neighbor users in wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-healing key distribution schemes realize an attractive
property: even if during certain sessions some broadcast
messages get lost, users are still capable of recovering the
session keys simply by using one of broadcast message they
have received during previous sessions and one of broadcast
messages they will receive in subsequent sessions, without
requesting additional transmissions from the group manager.
The mechanism enables a large and dynamic group of users
to establish session keys for secure communications over an
unreliable channel in the manner that is resistant to packet loss
and collusion attacks.
Self-healing key distribution scheme appears to be quite
useful in several settings where session key is used for a short
time-period, due to frequent changes in the group structure.
Military-oriented applications as well as Internet application,
such as broadcast transmissions and pay-per-view TV, are
important examples which can benefit from such approaches.
In addition, the self-healing mechanism is quite useful in com-
mercial content distribution applications or electronic services
in which communication contents are highly sensitive.
In this paper, we propose an efficient self-healing key dis-
tribution scheme for secure group communication in wireless
sensor networks. The scheme based on the notion of access
polynomial which is introduced in [1] and the security model
developed by Hong et al. in [2]. We point out the incorrectness
of efficiency analysis in [1]. We show that our scheme reduces
communication and computation overheads greatly without
weakening the advantage in the storage overhead. In addition,
we discuss the possibility of mutual-healing between neighbor
users in wireless communications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II,
we present an overview of earlier works in the area of self-
healing key distribution. In Section III, we introduce concrete
construction. In Section IV, we prove the security and analyze
the efficiency of the proposed scheme. In Section V, we
discuss the possibility of mutual-healing between neighbor
users in wireless communications. We conclude the paper in
the last section.
II. RELATED WORKS
The first pioneering work of self-healing key distribution
was introduced by Staddon et al. in [3]. Formal definitions,
lower bounds on the resources as well as some constructions
of self-healing key distribution scheme were proposed in it.
Liu et al. generalized the definitions in [3] and gave some
constructions in [4]. The schemes reduced communication
overhead and storage overheads by introducing a novel per-
sonal key distribution technique. In addition, two techniques
that allow trade-off between the broadcast length and the
recoverability of lost session keys were proposed. The two
methods further reduced the length of broadcast message in
situations where there are frequent but short-term disruptions
of communication and where there are long-time but infre-
quent disruptions of communication, respectively.
Blundo et al. in [5] showed an attack that can be applied
to the first construction in [3], presented a new mechanism
for implementing the self-healing approach, extended the self-
healing approach to key distribution, and proposed another
key-recovery scheme which enables a user to recover all lost
session keys (for sessions in which he belongs to the group)
by using only the current broadcast message.
More et al. in [6] introduced sliding window to self-healing
key distribution scheme. They addressed the three problems
in [3]. The three problems were inconsistent robustness, high
overhead and expensive maintenance costs.
Different from the revocation polynomial introduced in [4],
Zou et al introduced the notion of access polynomial in [1].
The scheme overcame some shortcomings existing in previous
schemes yet still possessed all the advantages of them.
The constructions in [1], [3], [4], [5], and [6] based on
Shamir’s secret sharing technique and are unconditionally
secure.
By introducing an improved secret sharing scheme, Tian et
al. proposed a self-healing key scheme with novel properties
in [7]. Firstly, the scheme reduced storage overhead of per-
sonal key to a constant. Secondly, the scheme concealed the
requirement of secure channel in setup phase. In addition, the
long-lived scheme was much more efficient than those in [3]
and [5]. However, the efficiency improvements are obtained by
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relaxing the security slightly. The scheme is a computationally
secure scheme.
To sum up, Shamir’s secret sharing is the most common
technique used to realize self-healing key distribution. It is
performs easily. However, the schemes suffer from high stor-
age and computation overhead. In this paper, we propose an
efficient self-healing key distribution scheme for secure group
communications in wireless sensor networks. We use access
polynomial to substitute common used revocation polynomial.
The underlying model is similar to the one given in [2] which
is optimized in terms of storage and communication overheads.
Our scheme further reduces communication and computation
overheads. Fortunately, the storage overhead in our scheme is
still a constant.
III. CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION
Let U = {U1, . . . , Un} be the finite universe of users. A
broadcast unreliable channel is available, and time is defined
by a global clock. The group manager sets up and manages, by
means of joining and revoking operations, a communication
group which is a dynamic subset of users of U . All of our
operations take place in Fq, where q is a large prime. m
denotes the number of sessions and t denotes the degree of
personal key polynomial. Let Gj ⊆ U be the communication
group established by the group manager in session j. Each
user Ui ∈ Gj holds a personal key Si, which is used to
recover the session keys as long as Ui is not removed by the
group manager from the group. Let Rj ⊆ Gj−1 denote the
set of revoked group users in session j and Jj ⊂ U \ Gj−1
denote the set of users who join the group in session j with
Rj ∩Jj = φ. Hence, Gj = (Gj−1∪Jj)\Rj for j ≥ 2 and by
definition G1 = U . Moreover, for j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the session
keys Kj(j = 1, . . . ,m) are randomly chosen by the group
manager and according to uniform distribution. For each non-
revoked user Ui ∈ Gj , the j-th session key Kj is determined
by broadcast information Bj and personal key Si.
The self-healing key distribution scheme is composed of
several procedures. We will introduce them one by one.
1) Setup: The group manager randomly chooses a t degree
polynomial S(x) from Fq[x] and keeps it secret. Furthermore,
it chooses a private unique identity IDi ∈ Fq and computes
S(IDi) for each user Ui. The tuple (IDi, S(IDi)) as personal
key Si is transferred to user Ui by the group manager over a
secure channel. The group manager chooses m session keys
K1, · · · ,Km from Fq. The session keys are independent to
each other and according to uniform distribution.
2) Broadcast: For any session 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the group
manager constructs the access polynomial
Aj(x) = (x − V ID)
|Gj |∏
i=1
(x − IDi) + 1
using private identities of users in session group Gj . V ID
is a virtual identity which is randomly chosen by the group
manager for each session and different from all users’ private
identities. |Gj | denotes the number of users in session j. Then,
the group manager computes
Pj(x) = Aj(x) · Kj + S(x)
for session j. The broadcast message Bj for session j is in
the following form:
Bj = {P1(x), . . . , Pj(x)}.
3) Key Recovery: When a user Ui ∈ Gj receives the broad-
cast message Bj , it computes Pj(IDi). Note that Aj(IDi) =
1 for any user Ui ∈ Gj . Ui recovers the session key for session
j:
Kj = Pj(IDi) − S(IDi).
One should note that Ui can recover the session key if and
only if he belongs to the Gj . For any user Ul 	∈ Gj , Aj(IDl)







which is different from the session key Kj .
4) Self-healing: Without loss of generality, suppose Ui
missed a broadcast message for session r < j. As far as it
belongs to the session group Gr, it picks up the polynomial
Pr(x) from broadcast message Bj , then computes
Kr = Pr(IDi) − S(IDi).
If more than one broadcast messages get lost, the operation of
self-healing is the same as aforementioned.
5) Add and Revoke user: If a new user Unew applies for
joining the session j, the group manager checks its legitimacy
firstly. If Unew is entitled to the session j, the group manager
chooses a secret and unique identity IDnew and computes
personal key S(IDnew)), then the group manager sends
personal key Si = (IDnew, S(IDnew)) to Unew over the
secure channel between them. In the procedure of broadcast,
the group manager constructs new Aj(x) which should include
(x − IDnew).
If a user Urov is revoked in session j, what the group
manager should do is excludes (x − IDrov) from Aj(x)
when it constructs the polynomial Aj(x) in the procedure of
Broadcast. The group manager makes sure that Ui cannot get
the session key Kj by using the broadcast Bj and it private
personal key Si. Because of the special construction of access
polynomial Aj(x), for any user Urov who is revoked from Gj ,
Aj(IDrov) is a value other than 1. If Urov performs the opera-





which is different from the session key Kj . For a coalition of
less than t+1 revoked users, they can collect at most t points
on S(x). S(x) is a t-degree polynomial so they cannot recover
it from t or less point on it. Even they get the unique identity
of an authorized user, they cannot recover any personal keys
of authorized users. Thus, Kj is completely safe.
The operations of adding and revoking are very efficient in
our scheme due to the application of access polynomial. For
the condition that more than one user joining or revoking, the
operations are the same as aforementioned.
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first prove the security and then analyze
the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
A. Security Analysis
In this section we show that our construction realizes a
self-healing key distribution scheme with revocation capability.
More precisely, we can prove the following theorem according
to the security model in [2].
Theorem 1. The construction is a self-healing key distribu-
tion scheme with t-revocation capability.
Proof: (Sketch)
1) The scheme is a session key distribution scheme:
(a) As described in the procedure of Key Recovery,
an authorized user can recover session key from the
broadcast message by using its personal key.
(b) On the one hand, since session keys are chosen
according to the uniform distribution and independent
to the personal keys, it is straightforward to see that the
personal keys alone do not give any information about
session keys. On the other hand, it is not difficult to see
that each Pj(j = 1, . . . , m) perfectly hides keys Kj by
means of Aj(x) and S(x) since Pj = Aj(x)·Kj +S(x).
The set of session keys can not be determined by
broadcast messages alone.
2) The scheme has t-revocation capability:
Suppose that a coalition R of t revoked group users
collude in session j. The coalition of R can collect at
most t points on S(x). They cannot recover personal key
S(x). In addition, the unique identity is kept secret. For
the collusion user R cannot construct access polynomial
Aj(x). For any guess of user unique identity they can
construct a different polynomial Aj(x). Thus, Kj is
completely safe.
3) The scheme has self-healing capability:
(a) For any Ui who is a user in session r and s (1 ≤
r < s ≤ m), the results Aj(IDi) = 1(j = r, . . . , s)
hold. Ui has personal key S(IDi). By the method
introduced in the procedure of Key Computation, Ui
can subsequently recover the whole sequences of session
keys Kr, . . . ,Ks. In fact, in our construction, a qualified
user can recover the all the session keys before the
session s. This is a stronger self-healing scheme.
(b) Suppose C ⊆ Rr ∪ . . . ∪ R1 be a colation of users
removed before session r and let D ⊆ Js ∪ . . .∪ Jm be
a colation of users who joins the group from session s
and satisfies C ∪D ≤ t. Because the coalition of C ∪D
can collect at most t points on S(x)(for any r < j ≤ s).
Hence, session keys Kj are completely safe with respect
to joint coalition of size at most t of new and revoked
users.
B. Efficiency Analysis
We take advantage of access polynomial which was in-
troduced by Zou et al. in [1] to design self-healing key
distribution scheme. Our scheme reduces communication and
computation overheads greatly meanwhile constant storage
overhead is kept. Table 1 in [1] shows quantitative compar-
ison of different self-healing schemes in terms of storage,
communication and computation overheads. The advantages
of [1] can be seen easily from the table. We point out that
the communication overhead in [1] comes from broadcast
Bj which is composed by 2m polynomial. As far as the
polynomial Pj(x) is concerned, Pj(x) = Aj(x)·Sj(x)+H(x).
Both Sj(x) and H(x) are t degree polynomials, and the degree
of Aj(x) amounts to (|Gj | + 1). Generally speaking, |Gj |
was larger than t. Therefore, the claim that communication
overhead is O(mt) is incorrect. A performance comparison




Schemes User storage Communication Computation
Hong (m − j + 1)logq (tj + j + t)logq (3t + 1)logq
Zou 2logq (t + |Gj | + 3)logq (t + |Gj | + 1)logq
New one 2logq (|Gj | + 2)logq (|Gj | + 1)logq
Although the proposed scheme reduces the communication
overhead greatly, the communication overhead increases with
the number of users in a group. It is meaningful to explore
new way to further reduce the communication overhead due
to limited communication capability of wireless nodes.
V. THE POSSIBILITY OF MUTUAL-HEALING
We consider the possibility of mutual-healing between
neighbor users in wireless networks. It is meaningful to detect
counterpart measures. In this section, we just discuss the
notions of it without exploring technical details.
More et al. in [6] pointed out that the protocol in [3] suffered
from inconsistent robustness. Subsequently, they used a sliding
window to make error recovery consistently robust: after an
initial Setup procedure, any lost key can be recovered as long
as two sufficiently close broadcast messages–one before it and
one after it–are received. Similar technique was taken in [1].
The minimum size of the window can be dynamic adjusted
according to network condition. Both [6] and [1] guaranteed
that user can recover window size session keys for previous
sessions if it receive a broadcast message. However, the
problem of how to recover the session key if the last broadcast
message gets lost has never been taken into consideration. In
addition, some applications, such as live and pay-per-view TV,
have strictly requirement of freshness. They would better lost
only a limit number of broadcast messages.
It is virtually impossible to make users completely self-
healing. We considerate the idea of mutual-healing, which was
also discussed in [8]. That is, if a user has missed more than a
fixed number broadcast message or the last broadcast message,
it can get assistance from its neighboring nodes. The users in
the same session group cooperate with each other forwarding
broadcast messages which its neighbor users missed. Thus
robust performance is achieved.
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Bohio et al. in [8] claimed that there are two requirements
for multi-healing: the authentication on requesting user and
the authentication on requested session key. If a user does
not receive the broadcast message from the group manager, it
will contact its neighboring user to get the missed session key.
The neighboring node needs to perform authenticate operation.
They suggested using an identity-based pair-wise shared secret
proposed in [9], as which requires less communication and is
non-interactive if identities are public.
As messages are broadcasted in the form of plain-text,
anyone can receive them. We argue that the authentication of
requested session key is needless. Instead, user only needs to
forward the broadcast message corresponding to the requested
session key. If the requesting user is entitled for the session,
it will be able to recover the session key, otherwise not. Nev-
ertheless, in order to avoid attacks on their limited resource,
effective countermeasures must be developed.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed an efficient self-healing key distribution
scheme for secure group communications in wireless sensor
networks. The scheme was based on the notion of access
polynomial introduced in [1] and self-healing key distribution
model developed in [2]. We analyzed the performance of the
scheme proposed in [1] and [2]. We pointed out the incor-
rectness in the analysis of communication overheads in [1]
and showed that communication and computation overheads
in our scheme reduces to the half of the ones in [1] without
weakening the advantage in storage overhead.
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